

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 010433  
ORIGIN OES-07

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SS-15 DOE-11 SOE-02 ACDA-12  
IO-13 PM-05 EB-08 CIAE-00 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00  
NRC-05 DODE-00 SP-02 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 /103 R

DRAFTED BY OES/NET/EST:JBORIGHT  
APPROVED BY OES/NET:LVNOSENZO  
S/AS:PFARLEY  
DOE:HBENGELSDORF  
ACDA:RROCHLIN  
IO:AJILLSON

-----022243 161455Z /46/62

O O 132328Z JAN 78  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 010433

IAEA VIENNA

CORRECTED COPY (OMMITTED LINE PARA EIGHT, LINE SEVEN)

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ENRG, MNUC, TECH

SUBJECT: EURATOM/IAEA SAFEGUARDS ARRANGEMENTS

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REF: A. BRUSSELS 77, 18954, B. GENEVA 77, 12375, C.  
BRUSSELS 77, 19145, D. IAEA VIENNA 77, 10069, E. IAEA  
VIENNA 77, 9306, F. IAEA VIENNA 77, 9573, G. IAEA VIENNA  
77, 9627, H. IAEA VIENNA 142, I. IAEA VIENNA 77, 9572,  
J. STATE 77, 262609

1. IN VERY BRIEF TERMS (PRIMARILY FOR INFO ADDRESSEES)

SITUATION DESCRIBED IN MORE DETAIL IN REFTELS IS AS FOLLOWS: THE EURATOM/IAEA AGREEMENT, WHICH ENTERED INTO EFFECT ON FEBRUARY 21, 1977, PROVIDES THAT FACILITY ATTACHMENTS BE CONCLUDED WITHIN 90 DAYS: NEGOTIATION OF THESE AGREEMENTS HAS BEEN TIME-CONSUMING, AND DG EKLUND HAS HAD TO TWICE ASK FOR EXTENSION OF THE 90 DAY PERIOD, LAST AT THE SEPTEMBER 1977 BOARD. AT THAT BOARD, THE SOVIETS VIGOROUSLY CRITICIZED BOTH THE IAEA NEGOTIATORS AND EURATOM FOR THE DELAY. IN VIEW OF PARAS 2 AND 3 BELOW, AND HUGE NUMBER OF EURATOM FACILITIES, ANOTHER EXTENSION WILL BE NECESSARY.

2. THE SUBSTANCE UNDER NEGOTIATION IS ONLY PARTLY KNOWN TO US. ONE ISSUE WHICH HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH US IS LIGHT WATER REACTOR (LWR) SAFEGUARDS. JUST PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 77 BG, US UNDERSTOOD THAT PROCEDURES UNDER CONSIDERATION WOULD PROVIDE ONE YEAR DETECTION TIMES AT LWRS, AND THUS RAISED GENERAL QUESTION OF ADEQUACY AT BOARD. SUBSEQUENTLY DISCUSSION OF LWR ISSUE AMONG IAEA, EURATOM, AND US HAS PRODUCED GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE CONCEPT. SOVIETS, HOWEVER, HAVE URGED STRONGER POSITION ON PART OF IAEA. DISCUSSION WITH MOROKHOV AND HIS STAFF IN GENEVA INCLUDED STRONG RESTATEMENT OF SOVIET POSITION; SUBSEQUENT EXPLANATION OF US VIEWS WHICH STRESSED NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY, WAS ACCEPTED BY SOVIETS AS "USEFUL", AND IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION BE UNDERTAKEN

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IN VIENNA.

3. A SECOND SUBSTANTIVE POINT RELATES TO SAFEGUARDS FOR REPROCESSING PLANTS, IN PARTICULAR THE WAK PLANT IN THE FRG. EURATOM HAS ACCEPTED THE KEY POINT OF CONTINUOUS INSPECTION; WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE IAEA HAS ASKED FOR THE ADDITION OF TWO KEY MEASUREMENT POINTS (KMPS) WHICH WOULD ALLOW 10-DAY DETECTION TIMES WITHOUT INCREASED MAN-DAYS OF INSPECTION. EURATOM DID NOT ACCEPT OR REJECT THIS PROPOSAL, AND PRIVATELY SAID IT WOULD BE EASIER TO ACCEPT IF TIMELINESS GOALS HAD SOME FORM OF BOARD-APPROVED STATUS. IAEA SECRETARIAT (FISCHER) AGREES THIS IS DESIRABLE. THE STANDING ADVISORY GROUP ON SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION (SAGSI) WILL BE CONSIDERING TIMELINESS AND OTHER IAEA GOALS AT THEIR NEXT MEETING, STARTING JAN 16.

4. DEPARTMENT AND INTERESTED AGENCIES ARE CONSIDERING HOW BEST TO HANDLE SITUATION DESCRIBED ABOVE, LEADING UP TO, AND AT FEB BOARD, IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE COMPLETION OF NEGOTIATIONS ALONG LINES ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES, AND MINIMIZE FURTHER CONFRONTATION IN BOARD. SCENARIO WE HAVE IN MIND IS FOLLOWING:

A. SAGSI WOULD HOPEFULLY REVIEW, DISCUSS, AND REACH SOME SORT OF CONSENSUS ON AT LEAST THE DETECTION TIME GOALS FOR REPROCESSING PLANTS. SAGSI-APPROVED GOALS WOULD PRESUMABLY BE BASED ON DESIRABILITY OF SHORT DETECTION TIMES FOR SENSITIVE FACILITIES, AND ON SOME SENSE OF WHAT MAY BE ACHIEVABLE. THIS WOULD BE INCLUDED IN SAGSI CHAIRMAN JENNEKENS SUMMARY REPORT TO DG EKLUND. FYI: WHILE WE HOPE TO RESOLVE THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THIS MANNER, THE US WILL WANT TO AVOID THE IMPLICATION THAT ACHIEVING A 10-DAY DETECTION GOAL WOULD SETTLE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER SAFEGUARDS COULD BE "EFFECTIVELY APPLIED" UNDER US AGREEMENTS. END FYI.

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B. DG EKLUND WOULD MAKE STATEMENT TO BOARD THAT AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON MOST SIGNIFICANT ISSUES, INCLUDING LWR SAFEGUARDS, AND THAT IN HIS VIEW AGREEMENT WOULD SOON BE REACHED ON REPROCESSING PLANT SAFEGUARDS ON BASIS OF, INTER ALIA, IAEA USE OF VIEWS OF SAGSI ON TIMELINESS GOALS. HE WOULD EXPLAIN NUMBER OF FACILITY ATTACHMENTS COMPLETED, AND SAY THAT ABOVE AGREEMENTS WILL ASSURE THAT ONE FURTHER 90-DAY EXTENSION SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO COMPLETE ALL ARRANGEMENTS.

C. PREVIOUS DISCUSSION OF THIS SCENARIO WITH THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE SECURED THEIR AGREEMENT NOT TO OBJECT FURTHER TO THE LWR COMPROMISE, AND TO BE MODERATE IN REACTION TO THE FINAL 90-DAY EXTENSION.

D. PREVIOUS DISCUSSION WITH KEY GOVERNORS FROM EURATOM COUNTRIES (E.G. UK AND FRG) WOULD HAVE ASSURED THAT THEY WOULD NOT OBJECT TO THIS REFERENCE TO TIMELINESS GOALS.

5. AS A FIRST STEP, DURING VISIT BY ROSE AND SINDEN OF CANADA JANUARY 10, DEPARTMENT DISCUSSED ABOVE POSSIBLE SCENARIO. ROSE WILL DISCUSS WITH JENNEKENS JANUARY 11 BEFORE LATTER LEAVES FOR VIENNA. MISSION SHOULD DISCUSS WITH BENNETT PROSPECTS FOR SAGSI CONSENSUS ON AT LEAST SOME TIMELINESS GOALS FOR REPROCESSING PLANTS, AND POSSIBLE WAYS TO WORK WITH JENNEKENS AND OTHERS TO ACHIEVE SUCH CONSENSUS. JENNEKENS WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH BENNETT BEFORE START OF SAGSI MEETING. IF JENNEKENS AND BENNETT CONSIDER IT USEFUL AND APPROPRIATE, MISSION MAY ALSO DISCUSS USEFULNESS OF TIMELINESS GOALS WITH OTHER SAGSI MEMBERS OR APPROPRIATE MISSIONS.

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SAGSI MEETING TO DECIDE ON DESIRABILITY AND CONTENT OF FURTHER CONSULTATIONS FIRST WITH EKLUND OR FISCHER AND THEN WITH SOVIETS, AND EC MEMBERS ON BOARD SCENARIO.

7. RE REF H DEPARTMENT CONCURS WITH MISSION PROPOSAL TO INFORM FISCHER THAT US WOULD NOT OBJECT TO BASIC POSITION IN WILLIAMS LETTER. THIS IS ON ASSUMPTION, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS STILL UNDERSTOOD (AS WE WERE INFORMED BY WILLIAMS) THAT ARRANGEMENT CAN BE REVIEWED AFTER INITIAL PERIOD TO ASSURE EFFECTIVENESS; WE WOULD RESERVE RIGHT TO SO STATE AT BOARD MEETING. WE WILL ALSO BE INTERESTED IN HOW FISCHER'S VIEWS AS TO NEXT STEPS COMPARE WITH THE ABOVE.

8. MISSION SHOULD REITERATE TO SOVDEL THAT LWR COMPROMISE IS ACCEPTABLE TO US AND WE BELIEVE FURTHER PROGRESS ON EURATOM/IAEA AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT BE HELD UP. YOU SHOULD ALSO EXPRESS HOPE IN LIGHT OF MOROKHOV/WARNKE/BORIGHT DISCUSSION IN GENEVA (REF B) THAT SOVIETS ALSO WILL NOT OBJECT TO OUTCOME, AND SAY THAT WE WILL BE IN FURTHER CONSULTATION AFTER SAGSI MEETING, WITH REGARD TO PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER PROGRESS. CHRISTOPHER

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ORIGIN EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /013 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:EUR/RPE:WSALISBURY

APPROVED BY:WSALISBURY

-----042453 181613Z /44

R 181150Z JAN 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0000

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 010433

FOR USEEC

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 10433 ACTION VIENNA INFO BRUSSELS  
LONDON MOSCOW BONN THE HAGUE PARIS ROME OTTAWA JAN 13

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 010433

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## Message Attributes

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**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** AGREEMENTS, NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 13 jan 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
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**Litigation History:**  
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**Message ID:** 20ab63e3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
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**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Status:** NATIVE  
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**TAGS:** ENRG, MNUC, TECH, IAEA  
**To:** VIENNA USIAEA  
**Type:** TE  
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**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
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20 Mar 2014  
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